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III. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction of this 
matter pursuant to the provisions of § 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code 
Ann. (1953, as amended) and Rules 3(a) and 4 of Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the judgment granted by the Third 
Circuit Court, Summit County, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston 
presiding. Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of service 
contract. Parties entered into an agreement, partly written and 
partly oral, for plaintiff to perform interior design work on 
defendant's home. Plaintiffs work was unsatisfactory and 
defendant terminated the contract before the work had been 
substantially completed. Appellant contends that he was not 
given sufficient time to prepare his defense and was not given a 
fair trial. Appellant maintains that the following acts by the 
trial court prevented a fair trial: 
a.Defendant's Motion for Continuance was granted for 
either one week after the trial date (when defendant was to be 
out of town), or granted for the same day the trial date was 
previously set. The trial was held on the date of the original 
trial date set. 
b.Defendant was told by the trial judge that 
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depositions might result in an attorneys' fees judgment against 
the defendant regardless of whether there was in fact an 
attorneys' fee provision. 
c.The trial court did not allow admission of relevant 
evidence relating to the amount of work addressed in the contract 
by either party. 
d. The trial court found that plaintiff substantially 
completed the interior design work and therefore the total design 
fee of $8,000 was due to plaintiff, minus the amount that 
defendant had already paid towards satisfaction of this amount. 
e. The trial court found that the type of contract 
entered into by the parties was not terminated by defendant; 
defendants' attempt to terminate the contract was not sufficient 
to warrant such termination. 
B. Course of Proceedings to Date 
Appellant, by and through his attorney, submitted his 
Statement of Proceedings and Evidence Omitted From the Record, to 
the trial court pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals Order, 
dated February 22, 1994, and in accordance with Rule 11(g), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellee filed his Appellee's 
Objection to Appellant's Statement of Proceedings and Evidence 
Omitted From the Record along with a Proposed Order entitled 
"Statement of Evidence Where Transcript is Unavailable". On 
March 23, 1994, the trial court judge signed the Proposed Order 
entitled "Statement of Evidence Where Transcript is Unavailable". 
Consequently, Appellant is now submitting this Supplemental 
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Brief addressing only the issues related to the amendment to the 
record, as set forth in the trial court's Statement of Evidence 
Where Transcript is Unavailable, pursuant to this Court's Order 
dated February 22, 1994. 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROCEDURES PROVIDED BY RULE 11(a) ARE INADEQUATE FOR 
RECONSTRUCTING AND SETTLING THE RECORD IN THIS CASE, 
Pursuant to this Court's Order dated February 22, 1994, 
appellant served his Statement of Proceedings and Evidence 
Omitted From the Record on the appellee's counsel in accordance 
with Rule 11(g), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("U.R.A.P."). 
Appellee responded with her Appellee's Objection to Appellant's 
Statement of Proceedings and Evidence Omitted From the Record and 
prepared and attached a proposed order of the Statement of 
Evidence Where Transcript is Unavailable for the trial court 
judge to execute. Upon such above-mentioned submissions by 
appellant and appellee, the trial court judge unilaterally, and 
without any court initiated hearing or discussion on the matter, 
signed the proposed order entitled "Statement of Evidence Where 
Transcript is Unavailable", which was prepared by the appellee's 
counsel. 
What is most disturbing about the recent course of the 
proceedings is that it defeats the fundamental principle of the 
impartiality of the trier of fact. In the case at bar, the 
appellant is appealing his case based upon the foundation that he 
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did not receive a fair and equitable trial. Because a crucial 
portion of the trial transcript was omitted from the record, this 
Court temporarily remanded the case to the very same trial court 
where the appellant was unable to receive a fair trial, for 
settlement and approval of the evidence or proceedings omitted 
from the record. 
Based upon the record, and the lack thereof, the trial court 
judge is not in the most "objective" position to determine 
whether he had any "recollection" of appellant trying to 
introduce documentary evidence in the form of a summary report. 
The appellant continues to contend that the summary report was of 
probative value to the very issue of substantial performance, and 
it would not be in the best interest of the trial court judge to 
"recollect" a portion of testimony that was omitted from the 
record and substantiates the very basis of this appeal. 
The fact that the appellee's counsel prepared the proposed 
order of the Statement of Evidence Where Transcript is 
Unavailable, which the trial court subsequently signed, presents 
yet another problem of impartiality. More particularly, the 
appellant makes note that the proposed order, which was prepared 
by appellee's counsel, provides the trial court judge with an 
opportunity to stray from impartiality by preparing leading 
statements for the trial court judge to adopt unilaterally 
without any further discussion or settlement with counsel. 
Specifically, the Statement of Evidence Where Transcript is 
Unavailable states that the trial court judge has: 
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no recollection of any evidence or exhibits submitted 
by the witness Susan St. James that were rejected by 
the court and not allowed to be admitted. 
See Exhibit "A", para. 7). 
Rule 11(g), U.R.A.P, specifically provides that: 
[t]he statement and any objections or proposed 
amendments shall be submitted to the trial court for 
settlement and approval and, as settled and approved, 
shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in 
the record of appeal. 
Th€i word "settlement" is defined as "determination by 
agreement". Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 1983. In the 
case at bar, it is obvious that the trial court judge did not 
consult with either counsel to make a "determination by 
agreement". The trial court judge unilaterally approved of the 
appellee's proposed order and signed it without any "settlement" 
amongst counsel to determine what testimony was omitted from the 
record. The trial court judge did not make an "objective" 
Statement of Evidence Where the Transcript was Unavailable. To 
the contrary, the trial court judge merely adopted the 
"subjective", "no recollection" statements prepared by appellee's 
counsel. Based upon this, the trial court judge did not; in fact 
make an "objective" "settlement and approval" of the evidence or 
proceedings omitted from the record pursuant to Rule 11(g), 
U.R.A.P.. 
The primary purpose of Rule 11, U.R.A.P., is to avoid the 
court's attempting to recreate, based upon conflicting testimony 
of counsel, what oral arguments were made by counsel at a 
hearing. Guardian State Bank v. Humphreys, 762 P.2d 1084 (Utah 
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1988) . 
In the case at bar, the procedures of Rule 11(g), U.R.A.P., 
have not adequately avoided this court *s attempt to recreate the 
record based upon conflicting testimony of counsel. In fact, the 
procedures of Rule 11(g) has compounded the main issue on appeal. 
By allowing the trial court judge to determine, via the 
appellee's subjective and leading statements, what testimony and 
evidence was omitted from the record, Rule 11(g) has not 
alleviated the problem of recreating a record based upon 
conflicting testimony of appellee's counsel and the appellant who 
was a pro se litigant at the trial level- For all practical 
purposes, the trial court judge has not fulfilled its obligation 
to come to a settlement between counsel on what testimony and 
evidence was omitted. 
This has put appellant's counsel in the very precarious 
position of trying to reconstruct a crucial portion of the trial 
through the recollection of the appellant and his witness, 
appellee's counsel, and the trial court judge who's manner of 
conducting the trial was allegedly unfair to the pro se litigant 
and who merely adopted appellee * s proposed order as his Statement 
of Evidence Where Transcript is Unavailable, without any attempt 
to further discuss or come to a settlement with counsel. All 
these factors have effectively denied the appellant his 
constitutional right to properly appeal the judgment of the trial 
court. 
In Emia v. Havward, 703 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
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Supreme Court stated that to prove that the loss of the 
reporter's notes from an earlier hearing effectively denied an 
appellant his constitutional right to appeal the judgment of that 
hearing, the appellant must show that the procedures provided by 
Rule 11 for reconstructing and settling the record were 
inadequate. 
In our case, as explained above, appellant has shown that 
effectively, the procedures of Rule 11(g) have not provided an 
objective, adequate means of reconstructing and settling the 
record. Consequently, the appellant has been effectively denied 
his constitutional right to appeal the judgment of the trial 
court. 
As stated in the affidavit of Ms. Susan St. James, a major 
portion of her testimony on direct examination by appellant was 
omitted from the record. See Exhibit "B", para. 2. 
Specifically, Ms. St. James states in paragraph 12 of her 
affidavit that: 
... the appellant attempted to introduce some 
documentation, in the form of a spreadsheet, that I had 
prepared which summarized invoicing, billing dates, 
check numbers, dates of payments, room by room 
breakdowns, who actually located the needed 
furnishings, and who actually arranged for the purchase 
of the furnishings regarding this case. 
See Exhibit "B", para. 12 
The summary report that appellant attempted to introduce as 
evidence during the direct examination of Ms. St. James, was 
exactly that, a summary of all the invoicing, billing dates, 
check numbers, and dates of payments which the appellee had 
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provided to the appellant. In addition, the summary report went 
into detail concerning room by room breakdowns, who actually 
located the needed furnishings, and who actually arranged for the 
purchase of the furnishings. 
In the trial transcript page 35, lines 18-20, the appellant 
makes the following statement: "[w]hat isn't in all these 
documents is what we did on our own. And so there's still things 
we haven't finished. That is - - -. See Exhibit "C". This 
statement made by the appellant gives some reference to the 
information that was contained in the summary report that was 
denied admission at the trial court level, thereby suggesting 
that the summary report was in fact, at least mentioned during 
the omitted portion of the trial transcript. 
All throughout the trial transcript it is quite apparent 
that the trial court judge does not allow the appellant to 
proceed asking questions regarding what the summary report 
contained, mainly about what work was done, which is relevant to 
the issue of substantial performance. See Trial Transcript, 
pages 31-42. However, the trial court judge does allow 
appellee's counsel to proceed asking questions along those same 
lines without interruption or objections. See Trial Transcript, 
from page 41. Such unequal treatment by the trial court judge 
has in fact denied the appellant an opportunity to present his 
case adequately in order to receive a fair trial. 
Appellant continues to contend that the summary report was 
of probative value to the main issue at the trial court level, 
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that being the issue of substantial performance. The trial 
court's decision not to admit such relevant documentary evidence 
was improper and an abuse of its discretion. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments and the course of the 
proceedings to date, the appellant contends that he has been 
effectively denied his constitutional right to appeal the 
judgment of the trial court. Consequently, the appellant 
respectfully requests that the judgment of the trial court be 
reversed and/or remanded to the trial court to be tried to an 
impartial jury in the interest of justice. 
DATED this Jif5? day of April, 1994. 
*nneth Allen 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this /afo day of April, 1994, I hereby certify that I 
mailed by first-class, postage-prepaid, two (2) true and correct 
copies Of the attached APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF to the 
following: 
Brent A. Gold 
333 Main Street, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 1994 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Kenneth Allen 
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Exhibit A 
BRENT A. GOLD 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
333 Main Street, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 1994 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone: (801) 649-8406 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
PARK CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
YVONNE GILLHAM, dba ] 
CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. ] 
DONALD E. ARMSTRONG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE 
WHERE TRANSCRIPT IS UNAVAILABLE 
Civil No. 92300086CV 
(Utah Court of Appeals 
Case No. 930236-CA) 
The Trial Court, having reviewed Defendant/Appellant's 
Statement of Proceedings and Evidence Omitted From Record, and 
Appellee's Objection to Appellant's Statement of Proceedings and 
Evidence Omitted From the Record, and having reviewed the file and 
transcripts in this matter, now herewith makes its Statement of 
Evidence where Transcript is not available| pursuant to the 
requirements of Rule 11(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
as follows: 
1. Susan St. James was called as a witness for 
defendant/appellant at the February 10, 1993 trial in the above 
referenced matter. 
2. A portion of Susan St. James' testimony upon direct 
examination of the appellant, which began on page thirty (30) of 
the trial transcript was inadvertently omitted. 
3. The witness Susan St. James was sworn in and was 
questioned by Donald E. Armstrong, the defendant/ who was acting as 
his own attorney. 
4. The testimony of Susan St. James that is omitted from the 
record was not significant. Any such omitted statements were also 
made during portions of the direct examination and cross 
examination that have not been omitted from the record. 
5. The vast majority of the purported testimony of Susan St. 
James was consumed by argument and attempted testimony by Donald E. 
Armstrong acting as his own attorney. Pages thirty through forty-
one (30 - 41) of the Trial Transcript of February 10, 1993, are a 
clear indication of the nature of the direct examination conducted 
by the defendant. 
6. The Trial Court allowed wide discretion in permitting the 
defendant to testify and argue, again as indicated in the Trial 
Transcript. 
7. The Trial Court has no recollection of any evidence or 
exhibits submitted by the witness Susan St. James that were 
rejected by the Court and not allowed to be admitted. 
8. The Trial Court has no recollection of any testimony
 f 
matters or evidence that was rejected in the trial of the matter 
and gave full consideration to all matters submitted by the 
defendant/appellee. 
DATED this J J j*^*mt^(&f£ . 1994, 
Cljirtr Circuit Court 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREWITH CERTIFY THAT ON THIS 31ST DAT OF MARCH, 1994 
A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE WHERE 
TRANSCRIPT IS UNAVAILABLE WAS MAILED BY FIRST CLASS U.S. 
MAIL POSTAGE PREPAID TO PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE AND DEFENDANT/ 
APPELLANT'S ATTORNEYS AT THE ADDDRESSES AS FOLLOWS: 
BRENT A. GOLD 
333 MAIN STREET, SECOND FLOOR 
P. 0. BOX 1994 
PARK CITY, UTAH 84060 
KENNETH ALLEN 
10 WEST BROADWAY 
SUITE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
& 
/? 
Wrfrs.KW. 
455 Marsac / Park City, Utah 84060 / 801-649-7462 
Exhibit B 
Kenneth Allen (6162) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
10 West Broadway, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, IJT 84101 
Telephone:(801) 322-2458 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
YVONNE GILLHAM, dba ] 
CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DONALD E. ARMSTRONG, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF 
i SUSAN ST. JAMES 
> CIVIL NO. 930236-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
SUSAN ST. JAMES ("Affiant")/ being first duly sworn upon her 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant was called as a witness for appellant at the 
February 10, 1993, trial in the above referenced case. 
2. 'Chat a major portion of my testimony by way of direct 
examination by appellant which began on page thirty (30) of the 
trial transcript was omitted. That the entire swearing in, 
several questions and answers were not recorded. 
3, On direct examination by appellant, I was asked whether 
I handled paying the appellee for the services she rendered. I 
answered that I did handle making the payments to appellee for 
her services under the agreement. 
4. On direct examination by appellant, I was asked whether 
I paid appellee on time. I answered that we made an extra effort 
to pay the appellee on time, and in fact paid her in advance at 
times. The appellee would call me up and ask for a check with no 
supporting documentation or billing statements. I had to insist 
that appellee send some form of documentation supporting her 
expenses. 
5. On direct examination by appellant, I was asked whether 
I did any purchasing of furniture and/or fixtures for the house. 
I answered that I did personally do some purchasing of furniture 
and fixtures for the house. 
6. On direct examination by appellant, I was asked whether 
the interior design of our house was finished in March of 1992. 
I answered that the interior of the house was not finished in 
March of 1992. 
7. On direct examination by appellant, I was asked whether 
there was any instance where I needed appellee's services after 
March of 1992. I answered there was, and I explained I needed 
additional fabric and had to go directly to the vendor and then 
get another designer to place the order. I explained that the 
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appellee had not completed the work she was obligated to complete 
under the agreement and that there were stills things that needed 
to be completed. 
8. On direct examination by appellant, I was asked about 
the working relationship between appellee and I. I answered that 
our working relationship had deteriorated over time into an 
adversarial working relationship. 
9. On direct examination by appellant, I was asked how the 
working relationship with appellee affected my marital 
relationship. I answered that the stress had caused continual 
conflict between myself and my husband, which eventually 
developed into a factor that led to the termination of appellee's 
services. 
10. During the direct examination by appellant, the trial 
court judge repeatedly interrupted appellant's line of questions 
and my responses. The trial court judge stated that he was only 
focusing on the agreement and all other information was 
irrelevant. 
11. On direct examination by appellant, I was asked about 
what services were provided by the appellee. I answered by 
referring to a spreadsheet document that I prepared, which 
summarized and evidenced invoicing, billing dates, check numbers, 
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dates of payments, room by room breakdowns, who actually located 
the needed furnishings, and who actually arranged for the 
purchase of the furnishings regarding this case. 
12. During the direct examination by appellant referenced 
in statement 11, the appellant attempted to introduce some 
documentation, in the form of a spreadsheet, that I had prepared 
which summarized invoicing, billing dates, check numbers, dates 
of payments, roan by roan breakdowns, who actually located the 
needed furnishings, and who actually arranged for the purchase of 
the furnishings regarding this case. 
13. During the direct examination by appellant referenced 
in statement 12, appellee's attorney objected to the admission of 
the spreadsheet that summarized invoicing, billing dates, check 
numbers, dates of payments, roan by roan breakdowns, who actually 
located the needed furnishings, and who actually arranged for the 
purchase of the furnishings regarding this case. Appellant 
responded to appellee's attorney's objection by stating that the 
documentation to be entered was merely a summary of the 
information that appellee had already prepared and admitted into 
evidence (i.e. invoices, payments) . 
14. The trial court judge sustained appellee's attorneys 
objection and denied the admission of the summary documentation. 
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15. On direct examination by appellant, I was asked whether 
it was hard to reach the appellee due to her travel schedule. I 
answered that it was hard to reach the appellee. 
16. On direct examination by appellant, I was asked if I 
ever contacted the vendors directly to expedite matters. I 
answered that I did in fact contact vendors directly to expedite 
matters when appellee was not available. 
17. On direct examination by appellant, I was asked whether 
contacting vendors directly ever created problems. I answered 
that contacting vendors directly did create problems. I 
explained that in one instance I did contact a Park City vendor 
directly because we were told by the appellee that is was 
appropriate. However, when appellee found out that we had 
contacted a vendor directly, the appellee told me that it was 
inappropriate and that we would have to wait and go through her. 
DATED this 3cx3l day of March, 1994, 
usan St. James 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me by SUSAN 
%V] day of March, 1994. ST. JAMES on t h i s 
Notary Pubfic 71 
My Commission Expires I 
October 14. IWT I 
„ StateofUtah 2 
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right. If she didn't like— 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Armstrong, see the problem was 
you ended it after she did it. That's the key. I don't think 
there's any question—regardless of this contract, what was 
said orally to amplify it or regardless of how inexact this 
agreement is—had you terminated the agreement on August 15th, 
1991 before she ordered item 1 for you and said, I don't like 
you, you're miserable to work with, you're causing frustration 
in my home, it's too much stress, it's supposed to be fun and 
pleasant or whatever to go buy things with you and it's a big 
pain in the bottom, I wouldn't for ten seconds enforce this 
agreement. I wouldn't let Mr. Gold prevail in a lawsuit to 
have you pay your $8,000. You have a right to terminate it. 
Absolutely, you're dissatisfied with it, you can terminate it. 
The problem is under the uncontested facts, she did 
what she was supposed to do. And you didn't like it but you 
still did it. And that's the point. 
MR. ARMSTRONG: What isn't in all these documents is 
what we did on our own. And so there might be 30,000 more and 
there's still things we haven't finished. That is— 
THE COURT: So, your next theory is that you're not 
going to pay her because there's furniture you bought, too. 
And frankly—I understand there's some real emotion here, 
Mr. Armstrong, and I'm trying to help you focus a little bit 
that it doesn't—that you're not connecting, really. That's 
35 
